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Effect of perceived default risk and accounting information quality on 
the decision to grant credit to SMEs 
 
Abstract 
The present study analyses the influence that perceived default risk and accounting 
information quality have on the process of credit granting to SMEs. Empirical evidence 
was obtained from a survey of 471 bank loan officers in Spain, in which they were 
asked to answer questions relating to audited and not-audited firms. Through a 
Structural Equations Modeling (SEM) approach, the results confirm that the likelihood 
that the loan officers are more willing to provide access to credit to SMEs, and to do so 
in more favourable conditions, is negatively influenced by perceived default risk and 
positively influenced by the general perception about accounting information quality. 
Besides, we find that information quality is an antecedent of perceived risk, so that the 
latter becomes the central element of the research model. Additionally, the perceptions 
of the decision-makers regarding all the analysed variables are better for the audited 
SMEs than for the unaudited ones. 
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The availability of bank financing for small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) is a 
topic of significant research interest among academics and a crucial issue for 
policymakers (Berger and Udell, 2006; De la Torre et al, 2010). This interest is driven 
in part by the fact that SMEs play a key role in the creation of wealth and employment 
of any economy. In addition, banks are the main source of finance for small firms (Cosh 
and Hughes, 1994).  
Regardless, a number of papers find that SMEs are more financially constrained 
than large firms, so they frequently experience problems obtaining both their required 
levels of bank financing and sufficiently favourable conditions of borrowing (see, 
among others, Cressy, 2002; Beck et al, 2005, 2006).  One of the often-cited main 
factors that hampers SMEs financing is opaqueness, which accentuates information 
asymmetries (Berger and Udell, 1998; Berger et al, 2001; Hyytinen and Pajarinen, 
2008). In the literature, “opaqueness” is often referred to the greater difficulties SMEs 
encounter in transmitting reliable information about their real status and performance, 
so that it is difficult for lenders to ascertain if firms have the capacity to pay (risk of 
adverse selection) and/or the willingness to pay (risk of moral hazard) (Hyytinen and 
Väänänen, 2006). 
In an attempt to reduce the inherent risk when granting credit to SMEs, banks 
seek to formalize both the information gathering process and the loan officer’s decision 
process. Application forms are developed to standardize information gathering. Banks 
provide training to loan officers that conveys explicit criteria that should be used to 
determine the creditworthiness of the borrower (Bruns et al, 2008). Nevertheless, 
despite banks’ efforts to homogenize the credit decision-making process, as De la Torre 
et al (2010, 2288) state, “SME ratings do not lead to the automatic approval of loans, 
but they rather provide the basis for the risk analyst to evaluate loans and decide on 
their approval”. Thus, it is logical to assume that loan officers play a key role in 
producing and interpreting information, and therefore, personal, perceptual or 
psychological variables also matter in the credit granting decision (Toft, 2002; Scott, 
2006). 
In this context, this paper studies the effect of perceived default risk and 
accounting information quality on the loan officers’ willingness to grant credit to SMEs. 
As far as we know, although empirical studies have shown the positive effect that 
information sharing has on the credit availability to SMEs (Love and Mylenko, 2003; 
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Brown et al, 2009; Moro et al, 2014), there is no previous research that has adopted this 
approach for studying the effect of the perception of risk (which is one of the most 
frequent variables included in decision-making models) and information quality (which 
is the key factor in the reduction of information asymmetries) on the credit granting 
decision-making outcomes (both credit access and credit conditions). 
Additionally, this study takes into account the possible effect of external audit 
because, as a control and supervision element of the information disclosed by 
companies, it could significantly affect the two perceptual variables included in the 
proposed research model. Previous research shows that the audited financial statements 
of smalls firms are crucial to the banks for making lending decisions (Berry et al, 1993; 
Cassar, 2011; Van Caneghem and Van Campenhout, 2012). There is also evidence that 
the desire to improve relationships with lenders is one reason why the directors choose 
to audit the annual accounts (Collis et al, 2004; Palazuelos et al, 2017). 
Accordingly, from a questionnaire to 471 Spanish bank loan officers, this study 
provides three fundamental contributions with respect to the previous literature. Firstly, 
we examine the effect of perceived default risk and accounting information quality on 
credit granting decision-making for the first time. Secondly, we take into account both 
the loan officers’ willingness to provide access to financing and to apply favourable 
conditions. Thirdly, we analyse whether there are differences in such process between 
SMEs that present audited financial statements and those that do not. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the second section, a 
theoretical revision of SMEs’ access to credit is made, paying attention to the role of the 
above-mentioned variables, and justifying the proposed research hypotheses. In the 
third section, the methodology is explained. In the fourth section, the results are 
exposed. Finally, in the fifth section, the implications derived from the work, the 
limitations, and the future lines of research are set forth. 
 
2. Literature review and research hypotheses 
2.1. SMEs’ access to credit: The role of accounting information and auditing  
In high-income OECD economies, financial institutions are the most frequent source of 
new loans, since the structure of their financial system reflects a clear predominance of 
bank intermediation (Demirgüç-Kunt et al, 2015). However, often depending on the 
size of the organizations, there are significant differences in the funding that is obtained. 
In particular, there is huge evidence that SMEs are those who most frequently 
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experience the phenomenon known as “credit rationing” (Cressy, 2002; Beck et al, 
2005, 2006). This corresponds to a situation where the company does not obtain the 
required funds or only acquires them under worse conditions than expected (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981; Casasola and Cardone, 2009). 
The opaqueness generally attributed to SMEs, which accentuates information 
asymmetries, is one of the main arguments that justify the importance of size when it 
comes to obtaining external funding (Berger and Udell, 1998; Berger, et al, 2001; 
Hyytinen and Pajarinen, 2008). When considering whether to grant a loan, the natural 
response for a bank is to seek more information in order to reduce the uncertainty about 
the likelihood of loan repayment. However, it can be particularly challenging to collect 
information about SMEs. It is not unusual for small businesses to have a short history, a 
lack of formal or public records, or a deficiency of formal control systems (Bruns et al, 
2008). This lack of information can put the banks at a disadvantage by making it 
difficult to differentiate between high-risk and low-risk borrowers (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981; Berger and Udell, 1998). For that reason, lenders may demand more guarantees 
and increase the cost of debt. In some cases, lenders may not be willing to provide 
funding and will consequently deny credit. 
Hence, the availability of different sources of information is an important 
valuation factor for credit granting decision-making. However, special attention should 
be given to accounting information, as the financial statements play a major role in the 
credit evaluation phase of the commercial loan decision (Libby, 1979; Danos et al, 
1989). However, accounting information loses its utility if it does not meet a number of 
quality criteria that serve to allow a lender to make the most appropriate and suitable 
decisions at all times. That is, accounting information has to be as timely, accurate, 
complete, relevant, and reliable as possible to serve as a basis for making business and 
financial decisions (Avery et al, 1996; IASB, 2009).
1
 
In that sense, audit reports that confirm or correct the data of the financial 
statements they accompany can contribute to the achievement of such an aim. In 
particular, the independent technical opinion they contain should help mitigate or 
placate information asymmetries between the companies and the financial groups to 
                                                 
1 Section 2 of International Financial Reporting Standard for Small and Medium-sized Entities (IFRS for SMEs), 
published by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), establishes 11 qualitative characteristics 
(understandability, relevance, materiality, reliability, substance over form, prudence, completeness, comparability, 
timeliness, balance between benefit and cost, undue cost or effort) that financial information must gather. However, 
there are five dimensions that have been most frequently used to refer to ‘information quality’: timeliness, accuracy, 
completeness, relevance and reliability (see, among others, Monczka et al, 1998; Nicolaou and McKnight, 2006). 
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which they relate, providing reliability and facilitating decision-making for users 
(Dechow et al, 2010; Guiral et al, 2014). In the context of credit granting, previous 
research shows that the audited financial statements of small firms are crucial for the 
banks in making lending decisions (Berry et al, 1993; Cassar, 2011; Van Caneghem and 
Van Campenhout, 2012). There is also evidence that the desire to improve relationships 
with lenders is one reason why directors choose to audit the annual accounts (Collis et 
al, 2004; Palazuelos et al, 2017). 
 
2.2. Perceived risk by banking decision-makers and credit granting to SMEs 
Bank lending decision is ultimately based on the estimation of the borrower’s default 
risk (Norden and Weber, 2010). That is the chance that credit applicants will be unable 
to meet their obligations under the stipulated terms (repayment of principal and interests 
on the agreed timelines). In an attempt to minimize the probability of error, banks 
generally use several lending technologies to determine the likelihood of debt 
repayment (Berger and Udell, 2006): financial statement lending, asset-based lending, 
credit-scoring lending and relationship lending. In addition, they seek to formalize both 
the information gathering process and the loan officer’s decision process (Bruns et al, 
2008). However, despite all formal procedures to support the decision to grant credit, in 
many (or most) cases, it is ultimately based on the loan officer’s judgment and 
perceptions (De la Torre et al, 2010). That´s why many authors argue that behaviour is 
not conditioned by the objective risk, but by the impression or perception that 
individuals have of it (Bauer, 1960; Mitchell, 1999).  
In general, perceived risk creates feelings of uncertainty, discomfort or anxiety 
(Dowling and Staelin, 1994), thus influencing the decision-making process (Siegrist et 
al, 2005). The studies available in the specific field of credit granting argue that when 
the risk associated to a company is potentially very high, banks may prefer to restrict 
their supply of funds, or apply more stringent financing conditions (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998). However, all of them have 
used proxies when trying to measure the expected risk, and no one have directly paid 
attention to loan officers’ perceptions, even when they are who ultimately decide 
whether to grant credit or not, and under what conditions (De la Torre et al, 2010). 
In accordance to that which was previously commented, the following 




H1. Loan officers-perceived default risk has a direct effect on their willingness to 
provide access to credit to SMEs. 
H2. Loan officers-perceived default risk has a direct effect on their willingness to apply 
favourable credit conditions to SMEs.  
 
2.3. Perceived accounting information quality by banking decision-makers and credit 
granting to SMEs 
It is well recognized that the information on financial statements varies a great deal in 
quality, ranging from highly accurate and reliable, to inaccurate and unreliable, to 
intentionally misleading (Dechow et al, 2010). Furthermore, SMEs are not required to 
publish the same quantity and quality of financial information as large companies. That 
is why acquiring and processing high-quality information are critical activities for 
decision-makers (Miranda and Saunders, 2003). 
Previous literature (Boze 1988; Mitchell 1999) corroborates this point of view, 
in noting that the higher the level of perceived risk, the greater the need to look for 
higher levels of information as the best strategy to reduce the unknown factors and 
make a decision. However, the mere fact that there is a significant amount of 
information does not reduce another area of uncertainty, known as, in the words of 
DeJong and Smith (1984), the information risk. This is the risk associated with knowing 
whether the information is timely, accurate, complete, relevant, and reliable. 
In particular, the perception that the information is high-quality should increase 
the likelihood that relationships will be developed in a more controlled manner, with 
less uncertainty and therefore with less perceived risk (Nicolaou and McKnight, 2006). 
Although this relationship has not been specifically tested in the context of credit 
granting, Fredriksson and Moro (2014) note that the more and the better the information 
collected, the better the position of the analyst to assess client and operation risks in the 
credit granting process, representing a lower overall risk of incurring future losses. 
Following this reasoning, it is possible to propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H3. Loan officers-perceived accounting information quality has a direct effect on their 
perception of SMEs’ default risk. 
 
Many studies consider that the key factor to accessing bank financing is the 
reduction of information asymmetries, which in turn depends on multiple factors, such 
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as the length of the relationship (Petersen and Rajan, 1994), the closeness of the 
interaction between the loan manager and the SME’s management (D'Auria et al, 1999), 
the bank’s involvement in the firm’s management (Elsas and Krahnen, 1998), or the 
physical distance between the lender and the borrower (Alessandrini et al, 2009). 
However, some believe that the information provided is the most important element for 
mitigating this conflict. In this sense, empirical studies (Love and Mylenko, 2003; 
Brown et al, 2009; Moro et al, 2014) have shown the positive effect that information 
sharing has on the credit availability to SMEs. In a more specific way, there are studies 
that show that the better the information is in terms of quantity and/or quality, the 
higher the likelihood is of accessing credit (Binks and Ennew, 1996) and obtaining 
more favourable credit conditions (Zecchini and Ventura, 2009; Moro et al, 2015). 
However, none of them focused specifically on accounting information, and did present 
some limitations. For example, Binks and Ennew (1996) only controlled for the 
willingness of the companies to provide information, Zecchini and Ventura (2009) used 
the number of employees as an indicator of creditor’s ability to gain an insight into the 
firm’s creditworthiness, and Moro et al (2015) only paid attention to the volume of the 
loan. 
According to this evidence, the perception that the accounting information is 
high-quality will positively influence loan officers’ willingness to facilitate SMEs’ 
access to credit and apply favourable credit conditions. Consequently, the last two 
research hypotheses are proposed: 
 
H4. Loan officers-perceived accounting information quality has a direct effect on their 
willingness to provide access to credit to SMEs. 
H5. Loan officers-perceived accounting information quality has a direct effect on their 
willingness to apply favourable credit conditions to SMEs. 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the theoretical model according to our research hypotheses. 







Quantitative research was carried out to test the above-mentioned hypotheses. Data was 
collected using a personal questionnaire, which included the following question areas: 
1) the variables included in the research model (accounting information quality, 
perceived default risk, credit access, and credit conditions), measured separately for 
Audited and Not-audited SMEs; and 2) the socio-demographic and professional 
characteristics of respondents. The variables of the model were measured using multi-
item instruments (7-point Likert and bipolar scales), which allowed us to obtain 
evaluations of psychological variables that cannot be quantified directly (Churchill and 
Iacobucci, 2002). 
The scales were adapted from previous studies in order to ensure content validity 
(see Appendix 1). The scale for the measurement of the “credit access” variable is based 
on the works of Nicolaou and McKnight (2006) and Wagner et al (2011), assuming that 
the intention to continue with the relationship of exchange is similar to the intention to 
provide access to financing. In the scale of “credit conditions”, the main variables that 
are applied in the credit policy have been included: volume granted, guarantees 
required, interest rates and other fees, and additional commissions. Likewise, “perceived 
default risk” was measured on a scale of five indicators based on the items proposed by 
Nicolaou and McKnight (2006), again adapted to the context of credit granting. Finally, 
the scale used to measure the “accounting information quality” was developed using the 
instrument proposed by Monczka et al (1998) and Nicolaou and McKnight (2006), 
which has been applied to analyse the quality of information in different contexts 
(supplier-buyer alliances and inter-organizational data exchanges, respectively). 
 
3.2. Sampling design 
The universe of the study is made up of Spanish bank loan officers with different levels 
of responsibility in credit granting decision-making, so that both employees of local 
bank branches and members of the Territorial Committees, or even of the Credit 
Operations Organs of the central offices, participated. The collaborating bank is 
specialized in the segments of SMEs, families, and self-employed, with branch offices 
throughout the whole national territory. In particular, 471 bank loan officers from 23 
Spanish provinces answered the online questionnaire. In this sense, Spain represents a 
perfect case of study for being a developed country, with a high predominance of 
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SMEs, of bank intermediation, and of credit restriction due to the financial crisis of 
2008. 
The collection of information was conducted through an online questionnaire. 
The respondents were presented a survey in which they were asked to value the items of 
each variable, first for companies with unaudited financial statements, and immediately 
after, for those with audited financial statements. Specifically, 1,069 emails were sent to 
bank loan officers, receiving a total of 471 valid responses, representing a response rate 
of 44.1%. 
Table 1 summarizes the socio-demographic and professional characteristics of 
the sample of loan officers used in the present investigation. Of the total number of 
participants, 66% were men and 34% were women, with a mean age of 44 years. Half of 
the sample had completed university studies, which shows the level of preparation that 
is generally required to work in the banking sector. In addition, the majority (86.4%) 
occupy a position with local responsibility. This is also consistent with the hierarchical 
structure of financial institutions, where when the level of responsibility increases, the 
number of employees decreases. Moreover, credit granting operations to SMEs are 
mainly managed at a local level. Finally, respondents had worked in the sector for an 
average of approximately 20 years. 
[Table 1 near here] 
 
 
3.3. Statistical analysis  
Before the results derived from these analyses can be explained, it is necessary to note 
that different strategies were used to avoid potential problems related to Common 
Method Variance (CMV) bias. The first strategy was the use of different types of 
measurement scales, as this can mitigate bias caused by the use of the same extremes in 
scales and anchoring effects (Podsakoff et al, 2003). In addition, the anonymity of the 
participants was guaranteed and it was indicated clearly in the introductory screen of the 
questionnaire that there were no right or wrong answers. That way we tried to reduce 
the level of fear and make the respondents less likely to edit their responses so that they 
were “socially desirable” or more in line with what they thought the researcher wanted 
them to answer (Chang et al, 2010). 
Additionally, the Harman’s single-factor test was conducted in IBM-SPSS 
software to check whether the correlation among variables was significantly influenced 
or not by their common source (Chang et al, 2010). The results of the analysis indicate 
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that the items load into more than one factor, and that they are not concentrated in any 
one general factor. Consequently, this method also supports that CMV does not 
significantly influence this quantitative research. 
Finally, it is important to point out that the questionnaire was sent to the bank 
loan officers twice. In the first round, 369 individuals responded, while 102 did it in the 
second. To test for non-response bias we compared the data of the first-round 
respondents with the data of the second-round respondents. The later respondents were 
considered as surrogates of non-respondents (Armstrong and Overton, 1977). The 
rationale is that non-respondents would be similar to late respondents based on factors 
such as lack of interest on the subject matter or the requirements of their jobs. The 
results of the comparison test between the earlier and later participants with respect to 
the background variables (gender, age, education, level of job responsibility, and years 
of experience) revealed that there are no statistical differences between the two groups. 
The descriptive statistics of the variables are summarized in Appendix 1. In this 
sense, the average values obtained for all the items measured are clearly higher for the 
evaluation of Audited SMEs than for Not-audited SMEs, and T-Tests show that there 
are significant differences in the average values of all the items between Audited SMEs 
and Not-audited SMEs. Accordingly, decision-makers perceive that accounting 
information quality is higher and perceived default risk is lower in Audited SMEs. In 
addition, their valuations regarding their willingness to provide credit to SMEs and to 
apply favourable credit conditions are also better for those firms. 
 
4. Results 
A covariance-based SEM approach was followed for the estimation of the research 
model, using EQS 6.1 software. Firstly, the measurement model was estimated with 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test the psychometric properties of the 
measurement scales (reliability and validity). Next, the model was estimated in order to 
contrast the research hypotheses. Lastly, the effect of the control variable (Audited 
versus Not-audited SMEs) was tested through a multi-group analysis, in order to check 
if the relationships established in the research model were affected by whether the 
financial statements provided by the SMEs were audited or not. 
4.1. Estimation of the measurement model  
The results obtained for the goodness-of-fit indices show a correct specification for the 
measurement model, for both the cases of the Audited and Not-audited SMEs. In 
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particular, there are three main classes of fit criteria: measures of absolute fit, measures 
of incremental fit, and measures of parsimonious fit (Hair et al, 2010). In this case, the 
statistics adopted are given by EQS 6.1, widely used in the SEM literature (Hair et al, 
2010): Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index (BBNFI), Bentler-Bonett Non-Normed Fit 
Index (BBNNFI) and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) for the 
measurement of overall model fit; Incremental Fit Index (IFI) and Comparative Fit 
Index (CFI) as measures of incremental fit; and Normed χ2 for the measurement of the 
parsimony of the model. The results summarized in Tables 2 and 3 confirm that, both 
for Audited and Not-audited SMEs, the BBNFI, BBNNFI, IFI, and CFI statistics clearly 
exceed the recommended minimum value of 0.9. RMSEA is located within the 
maximum limit of 0.08, and normed χ2 takes a value clearly under the recommended 
value of 3.0 (Hair et al, 2010).  
[Table 2 near here] 
 
[Table 3 near here] 
 
The reliability of the measurement scales was evaluated using Cronbach’s 
Alpha, compound reliability and AVE coefficients (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988). The values 
of these statistics are, in every case, clearly above the required minimum values of 0.7 
and 0.5 respectively (Hair et al, 2010), which supports the inner reliability of the 
proposed constructs (Tables 2 and 3). The convergent validity of the scales is also 
confirmed (Tables 2 and 3), since all items are significant to a confidence level of 95% 
and their standardized lambda coefficients are higher than 0.5 (Steenkamp and Van 
Trijp, 1991).  
Discriminant validity of the scales was tested following the procedure proposed 
by Fornell and Larcker (1981), which requires comparison of the variance extracted for 
each pair of constructs (AVE coefficient) with the squared correlation estimate between 
these two constructs (Tables 4 and 5). In all cases the variances extracted for each 
construct are greater than the squared correlation between them, so the discriminant 
validity of the measurement scales is confirmed according to this method, both for 
Audited and Not-audited SMEs. 
[Table 4 near here] 
 
[Table 5 near here] 
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4.2. Estimation of hypothesized structural model 
Once the psychometric properties of the scales were adequately examined in the 
previous stage, the model was estimated using Robust Maximum Likelihood. This 
method avoids the problems related to non-normality of data by providing the outputs 
‘robust chi-square statistic’ and ‘robust standard errors’, which have been corrected for 
non-normality (Byrne, 1994) and which consequently guarantees the validity of the 
model estimation. Figures 2 and 3 summarise the results for the estimation of the 
proposed research model both for Audited and Not-audited SMEs, indicating the 
goodness-of-fit indices of the structural model, R
2
 statistics for each dependent variable, 
and standardized coefficients for each relationship. 
First, the results obtained confirm that perceived default risk by decision-makers 
has a direct effect on their willingness to provide access to credit and apply favourable 
conditions to SMEs, thus supporting hypotheses H1 and H2. In particular, a better 
perception about risk associated to SMEs leads to higher probability of granting credit 
to this type of firms, and implies better conditions in terms of larger amount of funding, 
reduced costs and commissions, and more limited warranties requirements. 
Additionally, according to our empirical evidence, the perception that accounting 
information is high-quality positively influences the perceived default risk by loan 
officers (H3), as well as the two variables concerning credit granting: credit access (H4) 
and credit conditions (H5). Therefore, perceived information quality has a direct effect 
on the outcomes of the relationship, and also an indirect effect through its influence on 
the risk perceived by bank loan officers. That way, perceived default risk becomes the 
central element of the process. 
[Figure 2 near here] 
 
[Figure 3 near here] 
 
4.3. Multi-group analysis: Audited vs. Not-audited SMEs 
A multi-group model was applied to analyse the potential differences in effects included 
in the research model (hypotheses H1 to H5) depending on whether the SMEs present 
their financial statements audited or not-audited. Specifically, the multi-group models 
allow analysis of the equality of the parameters considered in a structural model 
between different groups (Byrne, 1994). Thus, the multi-group models allow evaluation 
of the structural parameters for each sub-group, as well as compare the obtained value 
for each causal relation using the LM Test. In particular, the differences among groups 
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using the statistics χ2 with a degree of freedom are analysed comparing the restricted 
and non-restricted models. The results of the multi-group analysis are summarized in 
Table 6. 
[Table 6 near here] 
 
The goodness-of-fit indexes of the multi-group model are clearly within the 
recommended values, confirming the fit of the model to data. The results from the 
Lagrange Multiplier test (LM test) show that there are no significant differences 
between the sub-groups of Audited and Not-audited SMEs (p-values > 0.01). This 
finding confirms the robustness of the research model proposed to explain the effect of 
perceived default risk and accounting information quality on credit granting decision-
making, as the direction and intensity of the causal relationships are the same, 
independent of whether the SMEs presented their financial statements audited or not-
audited. However, this does not mean that Audited and Not-audited SMEs are equally 
evaluated by loan officers, as the perceptions about risk and information quality are 
clearly better for the Audited SMEs, which results in a better willingness to provide 
credit access and apply favourable credit conditions. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This study analyses the effect of perceived default risk and accounting information 
quality on bank loan officers’ decision to grant credit to SMEs. Additionally, this study 
takes into account the possible effect of external audit, given that an external auditor is 
expected to provide different stakeholders of the firm with independent assurance 
concerning the accuracy of the financial statements, the non-existence of financial 
statements fraud, and the going concern status, thus improving accounting information 
quality and lessening perceived default risk. 
 
5.1. Theoretical implications 
First of all, the results obtained in the research support the fact that perceived risk by 
loan officers is a key variable in bank lending processes, as it has a direct effect on loan 
officers’ willingness to provide credit to SMEs and to do so in favourable credit 
conditions. In particular, a better perception of default risk associated to SMEs leads to 
higher probability of granting credit to this type of firms, and implies better conditions 
in terms of larger amount of funding, reduced interest rates and commissions, and more 
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limited collateral requirements. Thereby, our findings support the perspective of 
previous studies that have argued that when the risk associated to a company is 
potentially very high, banks may prefer to restrict their supply of funds, or apply more 
stringent financing conditions (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; 
Elsas and Krahnen, 1998). However, we add to previous literature demonstrating that 
the lending decision is influenced not only by an “objective” measure of risk (such as 
bank ratings), but also by the perception that loan officers have of it. 
Additionally, in accordance with the academic literature (Nicolaou and 
McKnight, 2006), this study supports that information quality positively influences the 
risk perceived by decision makers. That relationship had never been tested before in the 
specific context of credit granting.  
Besides, it provides additional evidence to that obtained in other countries 
regarding the influence of information quality on credit access (Binks and Ennew, 
1996), and credit conditions (Zecchini and Ventura, 2009; Moro et al, 2015). However, 
we specifically focus on accounting information, use a widely tested scale, ask directly 
to decision-makers and consider both the willingness to provide access to credit and a 
range of different credit conditions. That way, we propose a more complete research 
model, finding that perceived information quality has not only a direct effect on the 
outcomes of the relationship with banking stakeholders (credit access and conditions), 
but also an indirect effect through its influence on the bank loan officers’ perception of 
default risk. 
Furthermore, the direction and intensity of the causal relationships are the same, 
independent of whether the SMEs present their accounting information audited or not-
audited, which confirms the robustness of the research model proposed. However, the 
perceptions about default risk and accounting information quality are clearly better for 
the Audited SMEs. That confirms that external audit is a key factor for lending 
decisions regarding SMEs (Berry et al, 1993; Cassar, 2011; Van Caneghem and Van 
Campenhout, 2012), but this time relying on first-hand information provided by the loan 
officers. 
 
5.2. Practical implications 
The results have interesting implications from an applied point of view, and especially 
for four different groups. 
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Firstly, for SMEs that go to financial institutions in search of financing. On the 
one hand, it is essential that they are aware of the importance of presenting high-quality 
accounting information in order to increase loan officers’ willingness to provide them 
credit and apply more favourable credit conditions. In that sense, it may be a motivation 
to hire an audit service voluntarily. On the other hand, in view of the importance that 
risk management can have to improve relationships with the stakeholders of the firm 
(financial institutions in this particular case), it may be interesting for many firms to 
create the position of a Chief Risk Officer (Karanja and Rosso, 2017), who can be in 
charge of risk control, risk management, and risk mitigation. 
Secondly, for regulatory bodies, as some of the legal provisions on accounting 
and auditing are in line with reducing both the quantity and quality of information that 
SMEs are required to submit (for example, the increase in the thresholds for SMEs audit 
exemption; see Directive 2013/34/EU). However, with the present study, a clear call is 
made for greater consideration, since loan officers, who are one of the main users of 
SMEs financial statements, positively value high-quality accounting information and 
external audit services in the credit granting decision-making process.  
Thirdly, for banks or financial institutions, as our findings show that lending 
relationships cannot be reduced to figures. Beyond a complete set of financial ratios or 
objective criteria, both perceived default risk and accounting information quality, two 
perceptual variables, influence and help the loan manager to make granting decisions 
regarding SMEs. 
Fourthly, the obtained results may also be of interest to auditors, who can enhance 
the relevance and validity of their work based on the opinions revealed by bank loan 
officers, who are one of the main users of the financial statements and one of the most 
important stakeholders of SMEs. That is to say, they might take these findings as an 
argument to persuade SMEs of the desirability of hiring audit services voluntarily. 
 
5.3. Limitations and future lines of research 
To conclude, it is necessary to mention that in spite of the systematic methodology 
followed throughout the development of this study, the research that was carried out 
does present some limitations. On the one hand, it must be taken into account that the 
geographical scope of the study is limited to Spain, and that we just work with one 
financial institution. Anyway, Spain has similar characteristics to other European and 
OECD countries in terms of development, relevance of SMEs and bank intermediation. 
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Furthermore, since the beginning of the crisis and throughout it, Spain has been used as 
a reference country for the study of the difficulties of SMEs and, in particular, for 
access to credit, so it can be considered an international benchmark. Additionally, the 
collaborating bank has a national implementation and has met the requirements set by 
the regulator for all entities in the sector, which makes it comparable to its competitors. 
Likewise, the high sample size reduces the possibility of bias. On the other hand, we 
focus on the loan officers’ willingness to grant credit, which may not exactly match 
with their effective behaviour. In any case, decision-makers are faced very often with 
decisions on whether to grant credit, so it is likely that their responses to the survey 
reflect their perceptions and behaviour in past real situations. Moreover, loan officers’ 
perceptions and intentions are very important indicators in order to understand the 
cognitive process underlying credit granting decision to SMEs. 
Finally, based on the research carried out, it would be interesting to examine in 
future investigations the effect of other explanatory variables on the credit granting 
decision-making by loan officers, such as trust or the previous experience with the 
client, the business objectives set by the organization, and the general risk policy of the 
financial institution, among others. Regarding the auditing services, differences in 
valuations could be analysed, depending on whether they are provided by a Big 4 or a 
non-Big 4 firm. Furthermore, it would be interesting to extend the scope of the research 
to other potential users of the financial statements, such as companies that finance the 
internationalization of SMEs, public subsidy bodies, or suppliers of the firm. 
Additionally, it is worth mentioning the possibility of replicating this theoretical model 
in other countries with different economic, cultural, and legal characteristics, which 
could affect the valuations. 
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Appendix 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
*Sig. <0.1; ** Sig. < 0.05; *** Sig. < 0.01 
*Sig. <0.1; ** Sig. < 0.05; *** Sig. < 0.01 
*Sig. <0.1; ** Sig. < 0.05; *** Sig. < 0.01 
 
 
ACCOUNTING INFORMATION QUALITY (7-
point Likert scale): The information presented in the 








AIQ1 Timely 4.85 5.71 0.000*** 
AIQ2 Accurate 4.48 5.72 0.000*** 
AIQ3 Complete 4.36 5.77 0.000*** 
AIQ4 Relevant 4.83 5.79 0.000*** 
AIQ5 Reliable 4.25 5.80 0.000*** 
PERCEIVED DEFAULT RISK (7-point Semantic 
differential scale): In general, credit granting to SMEs 








RSK1 Maximum risk / Minimum risk 4.20 5.02 0.000*** 
RSK2 
Maximum potential for loss / Minimum 
potential for loss 
4.27 5.02 0.000*** 
RSK3 
Maximum probability of default / Minimum 
probability of default 
4.32 5.02 0.000*** 
RSK4 
Maximum probability of no recovery / 
Minimum probability of no recovery 
4.33 5.06 0.000*** 
RSK5 Minimum security / Maximum security ® 4.26 5.03 0.000*** 
CREDIT ACCESS (7-point Likert scale): In general, 
SMEs that present their financial statements 
AUDITED / NOT-AUDITED… 
Average value 
– Not-Audited 





Have a high probability that the bank makes 
a positive assessment of their overall 
position 
4.06 5.09 0.000*** 
ACC2 
Have a high probability that the bank feels 
predisposed to work with them 
4.10 5.17 0.000*** 
ACC3 Have a high probability of getting funding 4.09 5.11 0.000*** 
ACC4 
Have a high probability that the bank wants 
to establish long-term relationships with 
them  
4.15 5.17 0.000*** 
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CREDIT CONDITIONS (7-point Likert scale): In 
general, SMEs that present their financial statements 
AUDITED / NOT-AUDITED… 
Average value 
– Not-Audited 





Have a high probability of accessing large 
volumes of funding 
3.59 4.96 0.000*** 
CON2 
Have a high probability of being charged 
with reduced fees and commissions 
3.74 4.77 0.000*** 
CON3 
Have a high probability of being charged 
with low interest rates 
3.75 4.85 0.000*** 
CON4 
Have a high probability of being required to 
have limited guarantees/collateral 








Age (average) 44 years 
Education 
Professional training 4.9% 
Secondary 8.9% 
Mid-level University studies 24.4% 
High-level University studies 50.1% 
Postgraduate 11.7% 




Years of experience in the 
















AVE Goodness of fit 
indices 
Credit Access 
ACC1 0.91 0.93 
0.96 0.96 0.87 
 
BBNFI  = 0.92 
BBNNFI = 0.94 
RMSEA = 0.06 
 
IFI = 0.95 
CFI = 0.95 
Normed χ2 = 2.83 
 
 
ACC2 0.93 0.86 
ACC3 0.94 0.89 
ACC4 0.95 0.90 
Credit Conditions 
CON1 0.89 0.78 
0.92 0.93 0.76 
CON2 0.91 0.83 
CON3 0.93 0.86 
CON4 0.74 0.55 
Perceived Default 
Risk 
RSK1 0.87 0.76 
0.96 0.96 0.83 
RSK2 0.91 0.82 
RSK3 0.96 0.91 
RSK4 0.94 0.89 




AIQ1 0.86 0.74 
0.96 0.96 0.82 
AIQ2 0.94 0.88 
AIQ3 0.93 0.86 
AIQ4 0.93 0.86 















AVE Goodness of fit 
indices 
Credit Access 
ACC1 0.86 0.74 
0.95 0.95 0.84 
 
BBNFI  = 0.94 
BBNNFI = 0.96 
RMSEA = 0.06 
 
IFI = 0.96 
CFI = 0.96 
Normed χ2 = 2.68 
 
 
ACC2 0.93 0.86 
ACC3 0.94 0.88 
ACC4 0.93 0.87 
Credit Conditions 
CON1 0.84 0.70 
0.88 0.89 0.68 
CON2 0.91 0.84 
CON3 0.92 0.85 
CON4 0.58 0.34 
Perceived Default 
Risk 
RSK1 0.84 0.71 
0.96 0.96 0.82 
RSK2 0.90 0.81 
RSK3 0.94 0.88 
RSK4 0.93 0.87 




AIQ1 0.74 0.55 
0.91 0.91 0.68 
AIQ2 0.87 0.75 
AIQ3 0.83 0.69 
AIQ4 0.86 0.74 




Table 4. Results of discriminant validity tests (Audited SMEs) 





Credit Access 0.87a       
Credit Conditions 0.75b 0.76a     
Perceived Default 
Risk 
0.24b 0.21b 0.83a   
Accounting 
Information Quality 
0.25b 0.17b 0.19b 0.82a 
a AVE coefficient 
b Squared correlation between pairs of latent variables 
 
 
Table 5. Results of discriminant validity tests (Not-audited SMEs) 





Credit Access 0.84 a       
Credit Conditions 0.69b 0.68a     
Perceived Default 
Risk 
0.30b 0.20b 0.82a   
Accounting 
Information Quality 
0.18b 0.11b 0.20b 0.68a 
a AVE coefficient 
b Squared correlation between pairs of latent variables 
 
 








Goodness of fit 
H1: Perceived Def. Risk  Credit Access 0.38 0.41 0.73 BBNFI = 0.93 
BBNNFI = 0.95 
RMSEA = 0.43 
IFI = 0.96 
CFI = 0.96 
2 Normado = 2.72 
H2: Perceived Def. Risk  Credit Conditions 0.36 0.36 0.52 
H3: Acc. Info. Quality  Perceived Def. Risk 0.43 0.45 0.99 
H4: Acc. Info. Quality  Credit Access 0.27 0.30 0.12 
























































BBNFI  = 0.92 BBNNFI = 0.94 RMSEA = 0.06
CFI = 0.95 IFI = 0.95 Normed 2 = 2.82
 
 

























BBNFI  = 0.94 BBNNFI = 0.96 RMSEA = 0.06
CFI = 0.96 IFI = 0.96 Normed 2 = 2.68
 
** Standardized coefficient and p-value < 0.05 
